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Abstract—In the development of Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control (CACC) systems, spacing policies are primarily devel-
oped for optimisation of string stability and traffic stability. How-
ever, the safety issue is hardly taken into account. Uncertainty
in the communication network and sensor information makes
deciding upon a safe minimal headway a non-trivial task. In
this paper, we propose a model that is able to approximate the
minimal safe time headway, given uncertainty of parameters with
varying velocities. By simulating emergency stops, we use the
difference in displacement of the cars and a desired maximum
probability of a crash to approximate the minimum time headway
that yields this probability of a crash. The resulting method
is necessary for platooning, a major research development in
vehicular networking systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is one of the
major developments in recent research on Vehicular Network-
ing (VN). Its predecessor, i.e. ACC, is currently successfully
being deployed commercially by automotive manufacturers,
and CACC is expected to shortly ship to the market as well.
The proposed cooperation in CACC means that vehicles have a
wireless vehicle-to-vehicle communication system (which then
needs a new control logic) in addition to an existing ACC
system.
The main challenge for CACC is to drive comfortably and
safely at time headways that are significantly smaller than what
is currently possible with human drivers (which is, typically,
one second). The time headway is the distance measured in
time between vehicles in a transit system. It is one of the
pivotal parts of the so-called spacing policy in a cruise control
system, which refers to the desired steady state distance that
an (C)ACC system attempts to maintain from the preceding
vehicle.
With the addition of a communication system, there are
also many uncertainties introduced in the control system, in
addition to the already existing uncertainties from the radar.
Such uncertainties can come from, among others, packet loss
distributions, vehicle modelling errors, and driver behaviour
models. These uncertainties need to be incorporated when
determining appropriate spacing policies. But there are also
specific dynamics that we need to consider because of the
variety in surrounding vehicles and changing environmental
conditions (e.g. road network, weather). The combination of
these uncertainties and dynamics make it impossible to com-
pletely determine good spacing policies (and time headways)
beforehand. We thus need to move to variable (or: dynamic)
policies instead of constant ones. We have seen a similar
shift of research attention for ACC systems [1] 10-15 years
ago, which lead to development of variable-time gap (time
headway) policies instead of constant-time gap ones.
Much work in CACC focuses on the comfort issue (e.g. to
create string-stable platoons), but we concentrate in this paper
on the safety aspect. We aim to answer the question what
are safe time headways given current circumstances. These
circumstances then refer to the before-mentioned uncertainties
and dynamics. In CACC, the coordinated safety management
tries to guarantee safety in worst-case future developments
(e.g. emergency braking). In this paper, we investigate these
worst-case scenarios by means of computer simulations based
on given (C)ACC models. The considered scenario includes
two vehicles that are driving behind each other, where the
first vehicle makes an emergency stop – we then look at
the reaction of the second vehicle. On a side note, these
simulations could be seen as a Monte Carlo algorithm that
could later be used on-line (i.e. while the vehicle is driving)
to dynamically determine spacing policies, but this is currently
outside the scope of this paper.
While we thus consider determining time headways on-line
as future work, the above arguments should be sufficiently
compelling to completely abandon attempting to determine
constant times beforehand (i.e. off-line) for CACC systems and
we should move to try designing policies with variable time
headways. In the experiments in this paper, we systematically
investigate the effects of such variable times in different
systems (ACC and two different CACC systems). This is the
necessary ground work that needs to done before we can
move to developing on-line methods determining variable-time
spacing policies.
In our experimental approach, we assume certain parameters
of uncertainty. Using these parameters, we experimentally
derive the minimal safe time headway. Our results are therefore
only valid for this particular set of uncertainty parameters.
However, the main point we make in this paper, is that our
approach is valid. In other words, our method will derive the
minimal safe time headway for a particular set of uncertain pa-
rameters, and we illustrate this in this paper by experimenting
with a particular instance of these parameters.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we discuss related literature. In Section III, we
introduce the model that we used for our research. Section IV
describes the experiments and results. We analyse these results
in Section V, and we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
Our work is positioned with (C)ACC systems that address
spacing policies based on variable and constant time head-
ways, where performance is measured in terms of safety,
comfort and traffic flow improvement. We focus in particular
on modeling parametric uncertainties for CACC systems. We
briefly overview relevant literature on these topics here.
Petrov [2] builds a non-linear adaptive tracking controller
for a two-vehicle convoy, where the vehicles communicate nei-
ther with each other nor with the road infrastructure. Instead,
standard robotic methodology is applied to do autonomous
vehicle following, combined with a feedback-based controller
(employed by the follower vehicle). This work assumes (actu-
ally, aims at) a prescribed inter-vehicle distance (what we call
time headway).
An extensive review of constant time headways for ACC
is done by Swaroop [1]. Three different performance criteria
are considered: stability, safety, and traffic flow behaviour. For
ACC, safety guarantees can be given, even such that errors in
spacing do not amplify. Concerning stability and flow, smaller
time headways are required to achieve higher throughputs. The
review also shows that the control effort of an ACC system
with a constant time headway is inversely proportional time
headway: the smaller this time, the greater the control effort.
Parametric uncertainties in ACC systems have been re-
searched by Swaroop [3]. These uncertainties concern ve-
hicle mass, aerodynamic drag and time drag. The provided
solution to address these uncertainties is a Lyapunov-based
decentralised adaptive control algorithm.
In [4], Santhanakrishnan have developed a framework for
design and evaluation of spacing policies for ACC. Although
the evaluation criteria include string and traffic flow stability,
and traffic flow capacity, the framework does not explicitly
address safety.
Safety in ACC is an issue that is addressed explicitly
by Wang and Rajamani [5]. In this work, an ACC system
is proposed that can improve traffic flow and ensure safe
operation. The novelty of the system is that it uses a new
inter-vehicle spacing policy, in which the spacing is a non-
linear function of vehicle speed (called the variable time-gap,
VTG, policy). In comparison with a (then) traditional constant
time-gap, CTG, policy, the same level of safety is provided,
while improving the traffic flow. The question if ACC systems
should in general be designed to maintain a constant time-
gap between vehicles, is addressed in [6]. Another approach
that improves CTG based system is described in [7]. Zhao
et al. demonstrate a new spacing policy that is safe and
improves traffic flow. The policy is a non-linear function of
vehicle velocity and uses the vehicle state and braking capacity
information. The policy works best in high-density traffic
conditions.
Yi and Horwitz [8] propose an approach to macroscopic
traffic flow propagation stability for ACC vehicles. In this
approach, a non-linear traffic flow stability criterion is used
with a wavefront expansion technique. In earlier approaches, a
macro- with microscopic model was necessary with a constant
time headway. The new approach covered all stability con-
ditions obtained for these earlier approaches. Another VTG-
policy based ACC system is proposed by Zhang [9]. This
control system guarantees stability, and it regulates speed and
separation errors toward zero (with the leading vehicle drives
a constant speed).
While ACC systems are currently being adopted in con-
sumer vehicles, research and development into cruise control
focuses on enabling more and better cooperation between
ACC systems, yielding so-called CACC systems. Van Arem
et al. [10] describe the effect of CACC on traffic flow.
They conclude that, when the penetration level of CACC-
equipped vehicles is high enough (> 60%), traffic stability and
throughput is improved. In Yang et al. [11], a communication
protocol is proposed in order to make a cooperative collision
warning system on highways.
The main application area of CACC technology these days
is platooning. Broggi et al. [12] and Kanellakopoulos [13]
both use image recognition techniques in combination with
sensors to autonomously enable platooning. However, current
technology has improved significantly since then, and nowa-
days direct radio communication between vehicles is used to
enable platooning.
Naus et al. [14] thoroughly investigate the issue of string
stability in platooning, with both ACC and CACC controllers.
Their method includes several factors of delay in communi-
cation, but uncertainty of the information is not taken into
account.
In [15], an extensive architecture is given for a layered
multi-agent CACC architecture. The authors use this archi-
tecture to implement both centralised platoons (in which there
is a coordinating platoon leader) and decentralised platoons
(in which all cars operate as equals). Khan et al. [16] present
different platoon (in their paper, convoy) forming strategies,
based on a utility value of a platoon.
To summarise, in all of the above approaches to designing
CACC systems, uncertainty in information and communication
is not accounted for. Also, the works focus on comfort (string
stability) rather than safety. While these points have been
addressed for ACC (as shown above in the first part of this
section), this has not been picked up in CACC development
and research. These are the points that we address in this
paper: safety and parametric uncertainty in CACC systems.
We build further on earlier work [17] where minimal safe
time headways were experimentally determined for a number
of different (C)ACC controllers.
III. MODEL
In this section, we describe the model that we used for our
simulations. This model is an extended version of the model
that we introduced in [17]. It is a numerical model in which
different kinds of uncertainty are explicitly modelled. This
presence of uncertainty in information and communication jus-
tifies our choice for simulation, since it makes a mathematical
analysis of the problem too complex.
First we describe how we modelled the cars in our simula-
tion, and second, we describe the uncertainty in information
and communication that we included in our model.
A. Cars
We do experiments with three different types of car con-
troller. First, there is the adaptive cruise control (ACC) con-
troller. This controller uses the radar sensor of the car to
derive information about distance, velocity and acceleration
from the preceding vehicle. Second and third are the two
cooperative adaptive cruise control controllers (CACC1 and
CACC2). These controllers make use of direct communica-
tion between vehicles to derive the same information about
preceding vehicles.
The difference in technology between the ACC controller
and the CACC controllers has some implications. First, a
radar sensor can only measure the range (direct distance to
the preceding vehicle) and range rate (relative velocity of
the preceding vehicle). This means that information about the
acceleration of the preceding vehicle needs to be derived from
this information. When using direct communication, informa-
tion about acceleration can be transmitted directly. Second,
information that a car obtains from its own sensors (e.g. wheel
encoders for velocity, accelerometer for acceleration) is more
accurate than information a car derives from its radar input.
The task of our safety controller is to determine what the
minimal safe time headway is, with the constraint that it still
must be safe. We define the minimal safe time headway as
follows: it is the time headway a car must keep from its
preceding vehicle at which the probability of a crash does
not exceed 0.1%. This definition can easily be changed to a
lower or higher number, using the same model. We get back
to this in Section IV-B.
All controllers share the same update scheme, that is based
on a simple physics model in which velocity is updated
according to acceleration, after which position is updated
according the velocity. This update scheme is depicted in
Algorithm 1. Note that in our models we denote velocity as
the first derivative of position, ẋ, and the acceleration as the
second derivative of position, ẍ.
All controllers use this simple update scheme. The dif-
ference between the ACC and the two CACC controllers
lies in the way the controller derives the acceleration of the
preceding vehicle. The ACC controller does this using radar,
while the CACC controllers directly transmits information
about their own acceleration to the following vehicle. In the
following paragraphs, the controllers are described in detail.
These descriptions are at the agent level.
/* ∆t = 0.01 */
foreach timestep t do
ẍt ← compute new ẍ;
ẋt ← ẋt−1 + ẍt∆t;
xt ← xt−1 + ẋt;
end
Algorithm 1: Update scheme for cars
a) ACC controller: The radar in the ACC controller has
an update rate of 10Hz, and it takes an additional 5ms to
process each measurement. Each measurement consists of two
values: the range (i.e. the distance to the preceding vehicle,
measured in meters) and range rate (i.e. the relative velocity
to the preceding vehicle). Using two consecutive range rate
measurements, the acceleration of the preceding vehicle can
be derived.
In Algorithm 2, the pseudocode for the behaviour of this
controller is given.
foreach timestep t do
if Processed radar measurement m then
ẋpreceding,t ← m.rangeRate+ ẋself ;




Algorithm 2: Behaviour of the ACC controller
This algorithm takes the range rate from each radar mea-
surement, computes the acceleration of the preceding vehicle
and changes its own acceleration according to this accel-
eration. No communication between vehicles occurs in this
setting.
b) CACC1 controller: Both CACC controllers use direct
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication to exchange mes-
sages contains the vehicle’s acceleration. These messages are
sent asynchronously by each car at a frequency of 10Hz.
The CACC1 controller sends the measured value from the
accelerometer to the following vehicle. This means that the
value in this message can directly be used by the following
vehicle, instead of having to derive the acceleration from
multiple radar readings. This makes the CACC1 controller
more responsive than the ACC controller. In Algorithm 3, the
pseudocode for the behaviour of this controller is given.
This algorithm copies the acceleration value that it received
from the preceding vehicle. Also, this controller makes sure
that that each car sends messages containing its own accel-
eration (measured from the accelerometer) to the following
vehicle.
c) CACC2 controller: The CACC2 controller is a simple
extension of the CACC1 controller. Instead of the value of
the accelerometer, the predicted value of the acceleration is
communicated to the following vehicle. Since there is a delay
between a braking action and the actual deceleration of the
foreach timestep t do




if Sender is ready then // 10Hz
sendMessage(ẍactual); // to following car
end
end
Algorithm 3: Behaviour of the CACC1 controller
vehicle of 150ms, and the vehicle is able to predict the actual
deceleration very well at the time of the braking action, this
is a very sensible thing to do.
In Algorithm 4, the pseudocode for the behaviour of this
controller is given.
foreach timestep t do




if Sender is ready then // 10Hz
sendMessage(ẍpredicted); // to following car
end
end
Algorithm 4: Behaviour of the CACC2 controller
This algorithm is very similar to the CACC1 algorithm. The
only subtle difference is that, instead of the measured accel-
eration from the accelerometer, the predicted acceleration is
communicated the following vehicle. This makes the CACC2
controller more responsive than the CACC1 controller.
Both CACC controllers use time-based communication as
opposed to event-based communication. On the one hand, this
makes our model more robust, since receiving vehicles know
when to expect new messages and are able to anticipate when
a message does not arrive. This is not the case when we use
event-based communication. On the other hand, time-based
communication is less scalable. When many cars within a
certain range are constantly broadcasting messages, this will
influence the quality of the network.
B. Uncertainty & Delay
The algorithms that we described in the previous sections
are fairly straightforward, and if one knows the delays of
communication and information processing, it would seem
easy to compute the minimal safe time headway cars should
maintain to avoid crashes. However, since sensor information
and wireless communication comes with a lot of uncertainty,
the computation of the minimal safe time headway is not a
trivial task. In this section, we describe the various factors of
uncertainty that are present in our sensors, and the values we
used for these uncertain parameters. These values can be seen
as realistic. However, if the values of these parameters change,
we can still use the same model to approximate the safe time
headway that belongs to that parameter set. We will discuss
this issue further in Section V.
We have modelled all uncertainties using a Gaussian distri-
bution with deviation σ from the correct value µ. The delays
are hard-coded in the model.
Uncertainty:
• Radar range rate: σ = 0.1m/s. This is the relative
velocity measurement of the radar. This influences the
computation of the preceding car’s deceleration in the
ACC vehicles;
• Failure in radar range rate: in 0.1% of the radar measure-
ments, the radar fails to measure the relative velocity of
the preceding vehicle;
• Own velocity: σ = 0.1m/s. This also influences the
computation of the preceding car’s deceleration in the
ACC vehicles;
• Own max braking power: σ = 0.3m/s2 one-sided. This
is the error in a car’s estimation of its own maximum
braking power. For example, it could be that a car thinks
it can brake with −9m/s2, while in reality this is only
8.7m/s2. It is one-sided, since−9m/s2 is a car’s maximum
braking power. This influences the CACC2 messages with
the predicted braking power;
• Own predicted acceleration: σ = 0.3m/s2. This is the
uncertainty of the estimation of the acceleration when a
braking action occurs. This is the value that is sent by the
CACC2 vehicles, before the deceleration actually occurs;
• Own accelerometer value: σ = 0.2m/s2. In the CACC1
controller, the car only sends out the estimation of its
own acceleration. This has slightly less uncertainty than
the predicted acceleration;
• Failure in broadcasting: About 1% of all sent messages
do not arrive at their destination. This is a simplification,
because currently, we do not take into account bursts of
packet loss.
• Radar range measurement: σ = 0.5m. The distance to
the preceding vehicle. This measurement is not used in
our simulation, but we do include it in our calculations to
determine the minimal safe distance. See Section V for
more detail.
Delay:
• Mechanical brake delay: 150ms. This is the delay be-
tween the change in acceleration and the actual start
of that acceleration. This is essentially the difference
between CACC1 and CACC2.
• Radar processing delay: 50ms. This is how long it takes
before a radar signal is processed and ready to use.
• Communication delay: 10ms. This is how long it takes
for a message to be received.
These are the uncertainties and delays that we incorporated
in our experiments. Others include delay in bus, gateway
and radio channel access. These are not included in our
experiments, but these could easily be incorporated.
Fig. 1. The ACC scenario, in which car c2 uses its radar to obtain information
about relative position xr,c1 and velocity ẋr,c1 of car c1.
IV. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
In this section, we describe the scenario that we imple-
mented and the experiments we performed in this scenario.
A. Scenario
The objective of our experiments is to find a minimal safe
spacing policy for different adaptive cruise control controllers,
given various parameters that describe factors of uncertainty
in the system, as well as the vehicle’s velocity.
To this end, we simulate 2 cars on a highway, of which
the front vehicle applies an emergency brake at t0. The
following car has to respond to this emergency brake. The
way the following car responds to the emergency brake,
depends on the controller in the car. The ACC controller uses
radar, the CACC1 controller uses direct communication of
the actual deceleration, and the CACC2 controller uses direct
communication of the predicted deceleration. In Figures 1 and
2, these scenarios are illustrated.
In our experiments, we use a homogeneous set of cars. This
is a simplification of real situations on highways, where there
are of course many different kinds of vehicles with different
capabilities. This model can however be used with any vehicle
model, and any model of uncertainty. Our experiments are an
example of how this model can be used to determine minimal
safe time headways.
We did simulations with two different initial velocities,
20m/s and 30m/s. We then measured the difference in dis-
placement:
∆sj,i = sj − si (1)
where si is the displacement of the front vehicle and sj the
displacement of the following vehicle.
The displacement of a vehicle i is the distance that i
travelled from t0 to the moment of standstill tss:
si = xi,tss − xi,t0 (2)
We did experiments with 3 controllers (ACC, CACC1 and
CACC2) × 2 initial velocities (20m/s and 30m/s) × 100.000
runs per setting = 600.000 runs in total.
For all these runs, we measure the difference in displace-
ment of the cars, ∆s. For each combination of a controller
Fig. 2. The CACC scenario, in which car c1 uses direct communication to
transmit its acceleration ẍc1 to the following vehicle.
TABLE I








with an initial velocity, we then obtain the distributions of
∆s. For the remainder of this paper, we will call these the
base distributions Bc,ẋ, with c ∈ {ACC, CACC1, CACC2}
and ẋ being the initial velocity of the vehicles, and in our
experiments, ẋ ∈ {20, 30}.
B. Safe spacing policy approximation
In this section, we explain how we can use the base distri-
butions Bc,ẋ to approximate the minimal safe time headway.
In order to make these calculations, some variables must be
introduced:
• hẋ,safe: the minimal safe time headway, given velocity ẋ.
This is what we want to compute;
• p(Crash): the acceptable probability for a crash. We use
a value of 0.1%;
• ∆sẋ,safe: the safe difference in displacement, given ve-
locity ẋ. This value depends on ẋ and on the value of
p(Crash);
• di,j : the final distance between vehicle i and j at stand-
still, after a run;
For each distribution Bc,ẋ, we can compute the value of
∆ssafe. In order to do this, we first compute the convolution of
the base distributions with the uncertainty on the radar range.
This is necessary, because the safe distance is dependent on
how well a car is able to determine its distance to the preceding
vehicle. Then, we determine ∆ssafe by looking up at which
value of ∆s, the right-hand side tail of the distribution consists
of p(Crash)% of the runs. In our experiments, we set the
desired probability of a crash at 0.1%, but this can easily be
set to a different value without having to redo the experiments.
In this case, only this final step needs to be recalculated.
Using these values, we can now compute the minimal safe
time headway hẋ,safe, by dividing these values by the initial
velocity of the vehicles.
TABLE II
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The results of our simulations are visualised in Figures 3 and
4, that show respectively the experiments with initial velocity
ẋ = 20m/s and ẋ = 30m/s. The further to the right on the
horizontal axis the distributions are, the higher the distance is
that the following vehicle has travelled, relative to the leading
vehicle. So, the further the distributions are to the left on the
horizontal axis, the lower the minimal safe time headway will
be for the following vehicles.
Using the safe spacing policy approximation method as
described in the previous section, we obtained for each base
distribution B the safe distance ∆sẋ,safe and the safe time
headway hẋ,safe given a certain initial velocity ẋ. These results
are summerised in Tables I and II.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyse the results that we presented in
the previous section, and we validate these results by doing
control experiments with the results that we found.
A. Table analysis
The main results of our work are summarised in Tables I
and II. We see that the differences in safe time headway are
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Fig. 4. Results for our controllers when using initial velocity v = 30m/s.
very small for different initial velocities. This means that safe
time headway is (more or less) independent of initial velocity.
The results for safe time headway are very promising
in terms of feasibility. The numbers that we obtained are
the absolute minimum time headway that cars should keep.
However, research into string stability has shown that ideal
time headways are usually larger than the numbers that we
found. For example, research on string stability by Naus et
al. [14] report on minimal time headways of 2.8s for ACC
systems and 0.8s for CACC systems. These numbers are much
bigger than our results for the safety controller. This is good
news, because in this case, the string stability controller will
not often be interfered by our safety controller.
B. Base distribution analysis
In Figures 3 and 4, we show the histograms that contain
the distributions of our measured variable, ∆s. These are the
base distributions Bc,ẋ, that we introduced in Section IV. The
higher the ∆s, the higher the relative displacement of the
following vehicle. This means that lower values for ∆s are
better.
On an abstract level, we can draw the following conclusions
about the controllers:
• As expected, the ACC controller performs the worst, and
the CACC2 controller performs the best.
• There is a difference in the shape of the distributions
between the ACC controller and the two CACC con-
trollers: The CACC distributions are flatter than the ACC
distribution. This is due to the uncertainty and delay that
are introduced with wireless communication.
• When comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4, we see a relation
between the distributions of the same controller. The
means and standard deviations are both larger for a larger
initial velocity. However, we tried to fiend a direct relation
between these distributions, but we could not find such
a relation. Further research is needed in order to achieve
TABLE III
CRASH STATISTICS IN OUR CONTROL EXPERIMENTS.
Distribution % crash mean crash velocity max crash velocity
BACC,20 0.09% 1.66m/s 3.02m/s
BCACC1,20 0.07% 2.07m/s 4.60m/s
BCACC2,20 0.1% 1.55m/s 3.55m/s
BACC,30 0.09% 2.53m/s 5.50m/s
BCACC1,30 0.07% 1.42m/s 2.95m/s
BCACC2,30 0.1% 1.80m/s 3.39m/s
this. This means that as of now, we cannot create a base
distribution in which we leave out the initial velocity as
well.
C. Validation
In this section, we will validate the results in Table II. We
will do this by running our simulations once again, but now
using the initial headway values from that table. In Figure 5,
the histograms of the final distances between the two vehicles
are shown. Negative values on the horizontal axis denote
that a crash has occurred. From these histograms, it becomes
immediately apparent that only a very small portion of the
runs result in a crash.
Table III shows statistics about the crashes that occurred in
these simulations. We measured the percentage of crashes that
occurred, and we measured the mean velocity of the crashes,
as well as the velocity of the fastest crash in each setting. From
these results, we see that for all controllers, the probability for
a crash is indeed 0.1%, or even a little bit less. This validates
the values for safe time headway that we obtained from the
base distributions B.
Apart from the probability for a crash, we also recorded the
mean and maximum velocity of the crashes. We can conclude
from this table that none of the crashes that occurred in the
control experiments are lethal. The worst crash that we found
was 5.5m/s. This means that at the time of the crash, the
following car was driving 5.5m/s faster than the preceding
vehicle. This type of crash is easily damped by seatbelts and
the airbag.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we looked at safe minimal time headways
for (Cooperative) Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) systems.
Whereas much research effort is spent on making this system
such that they are comfortable for the driver (e.g. that the
vehicle does not continuously and abruptly accelerates and
brakes), surprisingly less effort goes into making these systems
safe.
One of the major development transitions in road of com-
mercialising ACC systems, was that it was shown that variable
time headways had to be determined dynamically instead of
beforehand. In this light, an important contribution of this
paper is that it demonstrates that the same holds for CACC
systems. Moreover, because of the many uncertainties involved
with communicating information between vehicles, the urge
for dynamic variable time headways is even stronger.
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Fig. 5. Results of our validation experiments. Using the safe time headway
values from Table II, these are the distributions of fi al distances from our
simulations.
Our investigation has been experimental by means of com-
puter simulation. These experiments show that the resulting
safe time headways are more or less independent of initial
velocity. Also, the found values for minimal safe time headway
are lower than the values that are currently used in controllers
that optimise on string stability. This means that our safety
controller will not interfere with the string stability controller
under normal circumstances.
Our resulting safe time headways still have a small, calcu-
lated risk of crashing. But even in the very unlikely event of
a crash (< 0.1%), the crashes that occur are far from lethal.
The work described in this paper is a first step towards
enabling vehicles to fully determine (variable) spacing policies
on-line (i.e. while driving) and autonomously. For future work,
the next step is to translate the findings of our experimental
investigation into letting vehicles determine time headways
while driving. On the experimental side, our simulations were
designed with minimal requirements for the strict purpose of
isolating the investigation of the research question. Still, we
also propose scaling up the simulations in the future in terms
of numbers of vehicles and complexity of the road network.
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